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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
BILLS AND NOTES-NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw-LiAmDITY OF TRUSTEE
SIGNING IN REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY-[Missouri].-Action against the
trustees of a common-law or Massachusetts trust on a negotiable promis-
sory note. The trustees signed the note in their "representative capacity,"
and within the authority conferred upon them by the trust instrument.
Held, that the trustees were exempt from personal liability on the note
under section 2649 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which provides that
"Where the instrument contains or a person adds to his signature words
indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal or in a representa-
tive capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized."'
A trustee is personally liable on all contracts entered into by him for
the benefit of the trust estate.2 This is true whether he acts in accordance
with the will or deed of settlement or under the directions of the court.3
However, if he can find a willing third party, the trustee may contract in
such a manner as to exclude personal liability.4 A clause, to be given this
effect, must expressly stipulate against personal liability most unequivo-
cally.5 The majority of jurisdictions hold that the signature of the trustee
in his "representative capacity" does not have this effect. 6
In so far as applicable, therefore, the Negotiable Instruments Law
changes this rule, and relieves a properly authorized trustee who discloses
the estate for which he is acting.7 This result is stated to have been the
intention of the framers of the Law.8 A possible interpretation of this
section is that it does not apply to equitable trusts,9 since there is nothing
1. Williams v. Shulte et al. (Mo. App. 1937) 103 S. W. (2d) 543.
2. 3 Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees (1935) 2105-6, sec. 712;
Miller, Franklin and Co. v. Gentry (Mo. App. 1935) 79 S. W. (2d) 470;
Mitchell v. Whitlock (1897) 121 N. C. 166, 28 S. E. 292.
3. 3 Bogert, op. cit., 2106, sec. 712; Scott, Liabilities Incurred in the
Administration of Trusts (1915) 28 Harv. L. Rev. 725, 725. For cases
dealing specifically with the liability of the trustee of a common-law or
Massachusetts trust see 65 C. J., Trusts (1928) 1104-1106, sec. 1059 b.
4. 3 Bogert, op. cit., sec. 714.
5. Ibid.; King v. Stowell (1912) 211 Mass. 246, 98 N. E. 91; Koken Iron
Works v. Kenealy (1900) 86 Mo. App. 199.
6. 4 Bogert, op. cit., 2266, sec. 772; Webster v. Switzer (1884) 15 Mo.
App. 346; Taylor v. Mayor (1883) 110 U. S. 330, 335, 4 S. Ct. 147, 150,
28 L. ed. 163, 165; Carr v. Leahy (1914) 217 Mass. 438, 105 N. E. 445;
contra, 4 Bogert, op. cit., 2267, sec. 772; Mobley v. Childs (1931) 172 Ga.
723, 158 S. E. 579; Neptune v. Paxton (1896) 15 Ind. App. 284, 43 N. E.
276.
7. Williams v. Shulte (Mo. App. 1937) 103 S. W. (2d) 543, 544 and cases
cited; Hamilton v. Young (1924) 116 Kan. 128, 225 Pac. 1045, 35 A. L. R.
490.
8. 4 Bogert, op. cit., 2272, sec. 775; Brannon, The Negotiable Instruments
Law (5th ed. 1932) 272, sec. 20; 1 Williston, Contracts (1936) sec. 312.
9. As distinguished from other forms which have many incidents of the
equitable trust, e. g., common-law or Massachusetts trust, trustee of a
deed of trust, executor, etc.
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in the section to change the common-law concept that such a trustee is not
an agent, but a principal, and "represents" only himself.10 The words
"representative capacity," however, have been construed to be broad enough
to cover any situation in which an individual does not act in his personal
behalf."3
Where a note is signed "X, trustee," the courts have split in determining
whether extrinsic evidence is admissible to disclose the "representative
capacity."'12 The weight of authority holds that as between the original
parties to the instrument and those with notice, the trustee may disclose
by extrinsic evidence an intent to sign in his "representative capacity"
rather than individually.13 By this evidence, the trustee relieves himself
of personal liability on the note.24 The minority of jurisdictions, however,
refuse to permit outside evidence to show a signing by the agent or trustee
in a "representative capacity," but hold him personally liable on the in-
strument.15
Where the trustee of an equitable trust contracts in behalf of the trust
estate, an action cannot be brought upon that obligation against the trust
estate or the beneficiary thereof.16 The reason is that the trust or trust
property is not a legal person. The beneficiary is not a party to the con-
tract, and the trustee is not an agent for him, or for the trust estate.17
The trustee is himself a principal, and the only person whom the court of
law recognizes as an obligor on the contract.' 8 If the creditor, however, is
10. In 4 Bogert, op. cit., 2271, sec. 775, the author advanced this possi-
bility from an a priori standpoint; Comment (1935) 34 Mich. L. Rev. 121.
11. Williams v. Shulte (Mo. App. 1937) 103 S. W. (2d) 544 where it
was said: "If it did not intend to exempt a trustee as well as an agent,
the clause 'or in a representative capacity' and the clause 'or as filling a
representative character' would have no useful purpose to serve." Supra,
note 10.
12. Prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law, the courts were in conflict
upon this issue: some held that the word "trustee" or "agent" was merely
descriptio perso-na; the majority of jurisdictions, however, allowed parol
evidence to show the true character of the signing, unless the opposite party
was a holder in due course. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2649, cited in the text,
does not expressly say whether the agent must indicate his "representative
capacity" upon the instrument itself, or merely to the other party. Hence
the same conflict still exists under the Negotiable Instruments Law.
13. Comment (1917) 27 Yale L. J. 686; American Trust Co. v. Canevin
(C. C. A. 3, 1911); Megowan v. Peterson (1902) 173 N. Y. 1, 65 N. E.
738; Hunting Finance Co. v. Young (1928) 105 W. Va. 405, 143 S. E. 102;
Riordan and Co. v. Thornsbury (1917) 178 Ky. 324, 198 S. W. 920 (1917);
Brannon, The Negotiable Instruments Law (6th ed. 1932) 174-177, sec. 20.
14. Supra, note 7.
15. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. Rossman (1916) 196 Mo. App. 78, 190
S. W. 636; Sparks v. Dispatch Transfer Co. (1891) 104 Mo. 531, 15 S. W.
417; Second Nat. Bank of Akron v. Midland (1900) 155 Ind. 581, 58 N. E.
833; Magallen v. Gomes (1933) 281 Mass. 383, 183 N. E. 833; Brannon,
op. cit., 156-159, sec. 20.
16. 3 Bogert, op. cit., 2105-2107, sec. 712.
17. 3 Bogert, op. cit., 2107, sec. 712; Taylor v. Mayo (1883) 110 U. S.
330, 335, 4 S. Ct. 147, 150, 28 L. ed. 163, 165; Conally v. Lyons (Tex. App.
1891) 18 S. W. 799.
18. 3 Bogert, op. cit., 2106, sec. 712; Robinson v. Springfield Co. (1885)
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unable to obtain satisfaction from the trustee, he may, by a bill in equity,
reach the trust assets, and compel the application of it to the authorized
claims against the trustee.19 Where the trustee contracts against personal
liability, therefore, it has been held that the creditor may sue the trustee
as trustee on the agreement, and then receive satisfaction out of the trust
estate.20 In the common-law or Massachusetts trust, the creditor may,
under any circumstances, sue the association directly, since it is regarded
for purposes of suit as a legal entity.21
Since the instant case is one of first impression in our jurisdiction, it is
well to note its consequences so as to be able to deal with trustees and
trust estates accordingly.
M. J. G.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CHILD LABOR AMENDMENT-RIGHT OF STATE TO
RATIFY AFTER REJEcTION-RzAsoNABLE TiME FOR AcTIN-[Kentucky].-
In a recent decision,1 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky has declared in-
effective the attempted ratification by the state legislature of the Child
Labor Amendment.2 The grounds upon which the conclusion of the court
was reached were: (1) that a state legislature, having once rejected an
amendment to the federal Constitution and certified such rejection to the
Secretary of State of the United States, cannot later ratify; (2) that when
more than one-fourth of the state legislatures have rejected an amendment
it becomes dead (irrespective of whether or not notices of rejection have
been certified to the Secretary of State) and resubmission by Congress is
necessary to validate subsequent state action upon it; 3 that even assuming
21 Fla. 203; Hussey v. Arnold (1904) 185 Mass. 202, 70 N. E. 87; Gates v.
Avery (1901) 112 Wis. 271, 87 N. W. 1091.
19. 3 Bogert, op. cit., sec. 725.
20. Id. at sec. 715; Scott, supra, note 3, 731-732. In Jessup v. Smith
(1918) 223 N. Y. 203, 119 N. E. 403, 404, Justice Cardozo said that the
trustee has the power to create a charge equivalent to his own lien for
reimbursement, in favor of the other who renders services under such a
contract.
21. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 728 and 729 expressly so provide; Note (1920)
7 A. L. R. 612, 629.
1. Wise v. Chandler (Ky. 1937) 108 S. W. (2d) 1024.
2. In 1926 the General Assembly of Kentucky adopted a resolution re-
jecting the amendment and its action was certified by the governor to the
Secretary of State of the United States. On January 13, 1937, a special
session of the general assembly adopted a resolution of ratification. See
Acts of fourth special session, 1937, ch. 30. Suit was brought to enjoin the
governor from certifying to the Secretary of State. The petition was later
amended to compel the governor to notify the secretary that the ratification
en route, was to be of no effect and to warn him of the pendency of this
action.
3. The Kentucky court quotes a letter published in the American Bar
Association Journal, July, 1934, by Mr. Frank Grinnell in which he says,
"Since the Constitution requires a vote of three-fourths of the several states
to ratify an amendment, it requires only one state more than one-fourth
to defeat ratification, and it sems to follow that the rule must work both
19371
Washington University Open Scholarship
